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ABSTRACT
MEASURING SELF-SELECTIVITY VIA
GENERALIZED CONDORCET RULES
ALTUNTAS¸, Ac¸elya
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
July 2011
In this thesis, we introduce a method to measure self-selectivity of social
choice functions. Due to Koray [2000], a neutral and unanimous social choice
function is known to be universally self-selective if and only if it is dictato-
rial. Therefore, in this study, we confine our set of test social choice func-
tions to particular singleton-valued refinements of generalized Condorcet rules.
We show that there are some non-dictatorial self-selective social choice func-
tions. Moreover, we define the notion of self-selectivity degree which enables
us to compare social choice functions according to the strength of their self-
selectivities. We conclude that the family of generalized Condorcet functions
is an appropriate set of test social choice functions when we localize the no-
tion of self-selectivity.
Keywords: Social choice, Self-selectivity, Self-selectivity degree, Generalized
Condorcet rules
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O¨ZET
GENELLES¸TI˙RI˙LMI˙S¸ CONDORCET KURALLARI
I˙LE KENDI˙NI˙-SEC¸ERLI˙G˘I˙N O¨LC¸U¨LMESI˙
ALTUNTAS¸, Ac¸elya
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Temmuz 2011
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda, sosyal sec¸im fonksiyonlarının kendini-sec¸erlig˘ini o¨lc¸meye
yarayan bir yo¨ntem sunulmaktadır. Koray [2000]’dan dolayı, no¨tr ve oy-
birlikc¸i bir sosyal sec¸im fonksiyonu ancak ve sadece diktato¨rlu¨k oldug˘unda
evrensel kendini-sec¸erdir. Bu yu¨zden, bu c¸alıs¸mada, sosyal sec¸im fonksi-
yonlarının test ku¨mesi, tek-deg˘erli genelles¸tirilmis¸ Condorcet kuralları incelt-
melerine sınırlandırılmaktadır. Bu kısıtlama altında, diktato¨rlu¨k olmayan
kendini-sec¸er sosyal sec¸im fonksiyonları oldug˘u go¨sterilmektedir. Ayrıca, sosyal
sec¸im fonksiyonlarının kendini-sec¸erlik kuvvetlerine go¨re kars¸ılas¸tırılmasını
sag˘layan kendini-sec¸erlik derecesi kavramı tanıtılmaktadır. Kendini-sec¸erlik
kavramı yerel hale getirildig˘i zaman, elde edilen genelles¸tirilmis¸ Condorcet
fonksiyonlarının sosyal sec¸im fonksiyonlarının test ku¨mesi ic¸in uygun oldug˘u
go¨sterilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal sec¸im, Kendini-sec¸erlik, Kendini-sec¸erlik derecesi,
genelles¸tirilimis¸ Condorcet kuralları
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Self-selectivity of a social choice function (SCF) is concerned with “choosing
how to choose”. We imagine a society, which is going to make a choice from
a given set A of alternatives, is also to choose the choice function to be
employed in its choice from A. Here a natural question arises that concerns
consistency between the choice from the set A of alternatives and the set
A of available SCFs. More specifically, the society’s preference profile on A
induces a preference profile on A where the SCFs are ranked according to
the alternatives they choose over the initial preference profile on A. So, the
question now is whether an SCF F chooses itself, if it is used to make the
choice of the choice function from among any finite set of SCFs including F .
If it does so, then F will be called as self-selective. If it does not, then this
failure can be regarded as a lack of consistency on the part of this SCF F .
By Koray [2000], it is well known that a unanimous and neutral SCF is
universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. The universality of
self-selectivity of an SCF F is that it selects itself among any finite set of
SCFs including F itself. There are two frequently used methods in social
choice theory when one wishes to escape impossibility results. One is the
restriction of the domain of preference profiles. The other one allows the
social choice rules (SCR) considered to be set-valued rather than singleton-
1
valued. In addition to these two approaches, there is a third way which is
peculiar to self-selectivity. It consists of restricting the set of SCFs against
which self-selectivity is to be tested. In this study, we focus on restricting our
test SCFs to a particular family which is different than all families that have
been employed in previous studies.
Either of these three methods may or may not end up with escaping
dictatoriality depending upon the particular way the method in question is
employed. In order to escape impossibility, U¨nel [1999] restricts the domain
of preference profiles to single-peaked ones and thereby provides a whole
class of non-dictatorial self-selective SCFs. Another result that allows the
existence of non-dictatorial self-selective SCRs is achieved by Koray [1998].
By allowing the SCRs considered to be set-valued, he proves that any neutral
top-majoritarian SCR which is self-selective at preference profiles where Con-
dorcet winner exists is a refinement of Condorcet rule. That is, he concludes
that the Condorcet rule is the maximal neutral and self-selective SCR at such
preference profiles. More recently, Koray and Slinko [2008] also find some
self-selective non-dictatorial SCFs by relaxing universal self-selectivity. They
start with a social choice correspondence (SCC) which can be thought of as a
constitutional rule reflecting the norms that a society wishes to adhere, and
restrict their test functions to singleton-valued refinements thereof. In par-
ticular, they prove that if an SCF is a refinement of Pareto correspondence
and self-selective relative to any set of test SCFs which are refinements of
Pareto correspondence, then it is either dictatorial or Pareto anti-dictatorial.
Although Koray and U¨nel [2003] utilize a similar method to Koray and Slinko
[2008], they end up with only dictatorial SCFs. The difference is that they
restrict the set of available SCFs to tops-only ones. However, it turns out that
dictatoriality cannot be escaped by this particular restriction of test SCFs.
A natural question concerning a non-dictatorial, thus a non-universally
self-selective SCF F is “how self-selective it is”. F may not be choosing itself
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from a particular set of test SCFs rendering it non-self-selective. However,
it is only natural to consider an SCF F to be more self-selective in case it
beats more rivals by choosing itself from among them. If self-selectivity is
regarded as a particular measure of consistency on the part of an SCF, then
it becomes important to introduce a proper measure of self-selectivity. One
obvious candidate is associating with each SCF the maximal sets of SCFs that
it beats in terms of self-selectivity. In this study, we employ a special family
of test SCFs, namely singleton-valued refinements of generalized Condorcet
rules, to that end.
Roughly speaking, for each q ∈ [0, 1], an alternative is a q-Condorcet
winner if it defeats any other alternative in pairwise q-majority. The usual
definition of a Condorcet winner corresponds to q = 1
2
. There are three main
reasons why we take particular singleton-valued refinements of generalized
Condorcet rules as our test functions for self-selectivity. Firstly, we can hardly
disclaim the central position that the Condrocet rule occupies in social choice
theory, which is only confirmed by its closeness to self-selectivity established
by Koray [1998]. Secondly, different q-Condorcet functions exhibit a well-
behaved pattern concerning self-selectivity in the sense that the degree of
self-selectivity increases as q increases. Finally, in this framework, testing a
given SCF for self-selectivity against each test function separately turns out
to be equivalent to testing it against collections of arbitrary sets of SCFs of
finite sizes. In addition to the simplicity it brings to the analysis, one can
also expect the measure of self-selectivity introduced via q-Condorcet rules
to reflect a genuine yardstick for self-selectivity.
After formally defining the notion of self-selectivity degree relative to q-
Condorcet rules, we apply this notion to q-Condorcet functions, p-qualified
majority functions, some special scoring functions and majoritarian compro-
mise. We modify the notion of self-selectivity degree when we deal with k-
plurality rules as strictly speaking the degree notion does not apply to them
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directly as it stands. We thereby obtain examples of non-dictatorial SCFs
which are not universally self-selective, but self-selective to a large extent.
In the next chapter, we introduce some basic definitions. Chapter 3 starts
with an illustrative example and shows some useful properties of the fam-
ily of generalized Condorcet rules. Chapter 4 reports a sequence of results
about some families of SCFs. Finally, Chapter 5 closes the thesis with some
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals with | N |= n. Let N denote
the set of natural numbers, set Im = {1, . . . ,m} and denote the set of all
linear orders on Im by L (Im) for each m ∈ N.
Definition 1. A function F : ∪m∈N L (Im)n → N is called a social choice
function (SCF) if, for each m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, one has F (R) ∈ Im. We
denote the set of all SCFs by F .
Take any finite set A with | A |= m ∈ N. Let µ : Im → A be a bijection,
i.e., a one-to-one and onto function. Now, any linear order profile L on A
induces a linear order profile Lµ on Im as follows: For all i ∈ N and k, l ∈ Im,
one has kLiµl if and only if µ(k)L
iµ(l). We define F (L) = µ(F (Lµ)), where µ
is a bijection from Im to A.
For each m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n and permutation σm on Im, we define the
permuted linear order profile Rσm on Im as follows: For all v ∈ N , ai, aj ∈ Im
one has aiR
v
σmaj ⇐⇒ σm(ai)Rvσm(aj).
Definition 2. F ∈ F is called neutral if, for each m ∈ N, σm on Im, one has
σm(F (Rσm)) = F (R). We denote the set of all neutral SCFs by N
Note that, neutrality of an SCF F implies that the labelling of the alterna-
tives does not matter and, also, it allows us to extend the domain of F to linear
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order profiles on any finite nonempty set. It is clear that µ(F (Lµ)) = v(F (Lv))
for any two bijections µ, v : Im → A if F is neutral. However, as we also con-
sider SCFs which are not neutral in this thesis, the bijection µ that is used
will matter.
Take any m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n and nonempty finite subset A of F . Define
for all F,G ∈ A and i ∈ N , FRiAG if and only if F (R)RiG(R). Note that
RiA is a complete preorder on A as more than one SCF in A can choose the
same alternative in Im. Thus, any linear order profile R ∈ L (Im)n induces a
preference profile RA on any nonempty finite subset A of F .
Definition 3. Let RiA be a complete preorder on A. A linear order Li is said
to be compatible with RiA if, for all F,G ∈ A, FRiAG is implied by FLiG.
The set of all linear order profiles on A is denoted by L(A)n.
Definition 4. For all m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n and nonempty finite subset A of
N , define the set of all linear order profiles on A induced by R, L(A, R), as
follows: L(A, R) = {L ∈ L(A)n | Li is a linear order on A compatible with
RiA for each i ∈ N}.
For each nonempty finite subset A of F , choose and fix a bijection µA :
Im → A, where | A |= m. Given an SCF F : ∪m∈N L (Im)n → N, for each
nonempty finite subset A of F , we obtain an extension F : L(A)n → A of F
via µA. Note that here we use the same symbol F for both the given SCF
and its extension to L(A)n, which we will continue to do in the sequel. This
will lead to no ambiguity so long as the family of bijection {µA} is kept fixed.
Definition 5. i. Given F ∈ F , m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n and a finite subset A
of F with F ∈ A, we say that F is self-selective at R relative to A with
respect to {µA} if there exists some L ∈ L(A, R) such that F = F (L).
ii. F is said to be self-selective at R with respect to {µA} if F is self-selective
at R relative to any finite subset A of F with F ∈ A with respect to
{µA}.
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iii. F is said to be universally self-selective with respect to {µA} if F is
self-selective at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n relative to any finite subset A
of F with F ∈ A with respect to {µA}.
Definition 6. Let | N |= n, A ⊆ F be given. An SCF F ∈ F is said to be
self-selective relative to A if there is some {µA} such that F is self-selective
at each R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n relative to A with respect to {µA}.
Definition 7. An SCF F ∈ F is said to be unanimous if, for all m ∈ N,
R ∈ L(Im)n and a ∈ Im we have [∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ Im : aRib]⇒ F (R) = a.
Definition 8. An SCF F ∈ F is said to be dictatorial if and only if ∃i ∈
N,∀m ∈ N, ∀R ∈ L(Im)n such that F (R) = arg maxIm Ri.
Koray [2000] shows that when m ≥ 3 any neutral and unanimous SCF F
is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial.
Remark 1. Take any non-dictatorial SCF F ∈ F . Let F be tested only
against itself, i.e. A = {F} ⊂ F . Then F is trivially self-selective relative
to A. On the other hand, if we let A = N then, by Koray [2000], F is not
self-selective relative to A since it is a non-dictatorial SCF. So, we conclude
that there exists a maximal finite nonempty subset A of N such that F is
self-selective relative to A.
Definition 9. Given any m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n, q ∈ [0, 1], an alternative
a ∈ Im is said to be a q-Condorcet winner at R if | {i ∈ N | aRib} |≥ nq for
all b ∈ Im \ {a}.
We denote the set of all q-Condorcet winners at R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n by
CWq(R). An SCR Cq is called the q-Condorcet rule if it selects all q-Condorcet
winners at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Remark 2. Take any R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n. For q = 0, Cq(R) = Im. For q = 1 we
have Cq(R) = {a} if L(a,Ri) = Im for each i ∈ N and Cq(R) = ∅ otherwise.
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We only consider societies with odd number of individuals, i.e., n = 2k+1
where k ≥ 1 is an integer. Moreover, for any m ∈ N, we fix the usual ordering
on Im, so we have 1 < 2 < · · · < m.
Definition 10. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n the q-Condorcet function, Cq, is
defined by:
Cq(R) =
 1 if CWq(R) = ∅min{CWq(R)} if CWq(R) 6= ∅
Basically, for R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im), if the set of q-Condorcet winners is empty,
then the q-Condorcet function chooses the minimal alternative of Im relative
to the ordering defined above. If the winner set is non-empty, then the q-
Condorcet function chooses the minimal alternative of the winner set relative
to the ordering that we defined.
For any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, let CWq(L) be the set of all q-Condorcet
winners at L ∈ L(A, R). Now, given m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n, A ⊆ F , the
self-selectivity of the q-Condorcet function relative to A is defined as follows:
- When CWq(L) = ∅ for some L ∈ L(A, R), Cq is self-selective at R
relative to A.
- When CWq(L) 6= ∅ for each L ∈ L(A, R), Cq is self-selective at R
relative to A if Cq ∈ CWq(L) for some L ∈ L(A, R).
Note that there always is a bijection µA : A → Ik, where k =| A |, such
that µA(Cq) is minimal in µA(CWq(L)). Thus, the definition is consistent
with our general definition of self-selectivity at R relative to A.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERALIZED CONDORCET
FUNCTIONS AND SELF-SELECTIVITY
DEGREE
We, first, test the self-selectivity of Cq relative toA = {Cq, Cq′} for each q′ ∈
(0, 1] and obtain some useful properties of the family of particular singleton-
valued refinements of generalized Condorcet rules. Then, we define the notion
of self-selectivity degree of an SCF relative to q-Condorcet rules to measure
self-selectivity of SCFs.
Before proceeding further, it will be illuminating to see how the self-
selectivity of Cq differs relative to A′ = {Cq, Cq′} where q, q′ ∈ (0, 1] are such
that q < q′, CWq′(R) ⊆ CWq(R), and A′′ = {Cq, Cq′′} where q, q′′ ∈ (0, 1] are
such that q′′ < q, CWq(R) $ CWq′′(R) at each R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n.
3.1 Example
Consider a society N = {α, β, γ, δ, ζ} consisting of five individuals. Take
C 1
2
, C 2
3
, C 1
3
∈ F , which are all unanimous. Now let us consider the following
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linear order profile R ∈ I4:
Rα Rβ Rγ Rδ Rζ
2 2 3 3 4
1 1 2 2 3
4 4 1 1 2
3 3 4 4 1
First consider the case where C 1
2
is tested only against C 2
3
, i.e., the set of
available SCFs is A′ = {C 1
2
, C 2
3
}. We have CW 1
2
(R) = CW 2
3
(R) = ∅ implying
that C 1
2
(R) = C 2
3
(R) = 1. The complete preorder RA′ on A′ induced by R
is represented in the following table with a comma separating alternatives
indicating an indifference class:
RαA′ R
β
A′ R
γ
A′ R
δ
A′ R
ζ
A′
C 1
2
, C 2
3
C 1
2
, C 2
3
C 1
2
, C 2
3
C 1
2
, C 2
3
C 1
2
, C 2
3
Thus, we have 24 linear order profiles compatible with the above complete
preorder profile in each component. The linear order profile L′ is a member
of L(A′, R):
L
′α L
′β L
′γ L
′δ L
′ζ
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 2
3
C 2
3
C 2
3
C 2
3
C 2
3
Since C 1
2
(L′) = C 1
2
, we conclude that C 1
2
is self-selective at R relative to
A′. Roughly speaking, C 1
2
is self-selective at R when it is tested against a
less generous SCF, namely C 2
3
.
Now consider the case where the set of available SCFs, A′′, consists of
only C 1
2
and C 1
3
, i.e., A′′ = {C 1
2
, C 1
3
}. Since CW 1
3
(R) = {2, 3}, we have
C 1
3
(R) = 2. Thus, L(A′′, R) consists of one member L′′ only, where:
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L
′′α L
′′β L
′′γ L
′′δ L
′′ζ
C 1
3
C 1
3
C 1
3
C 1
3
C 1
3
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
C 1
2
Now, C 1
2
(L′′) = C 1
3
6= C 1
2
. Since L(A′′, R) = {L′′}, this means that C 1
2
is not self-selective at R relative to A′′. That is, C 1
2
is not self-selective at R
when it is tested against a more generous SCF C 1
3
.
In the following proposition, we generalize the result that we provide in
the above example and thereby show that q-Condorcet functions exhibit a
well-behaved pattern in terms of self-selectivity. That is, any q-Condorcet
function chooses itself whenever it is tested against a less generous Condorcet
function and fails to choose itself whenever it is tested against a more generous
Condorcet function.
3.2 Results
Proposition 1. Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals and q ∈ (0, 1]
be given.
1. Cq is self-selective relative to A = {Cq, Cq′}, where q′ ∈ (0, 1] is such
that q < q′ and CWq′(R) ⊆ CWq(R) at any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
2. Cq is not self-selective relative to A = {Cq, Cq′}, where q′ ∈ (0, 1] is
such that q′ < q and CWq(R) $ CWq′(R) at any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Proof. First, note that, given m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, CWq(R) = CW l+1
n
(R) for
any q ∈ ( l
n
, l+1
n
], where l is an integer from the set {0, 1, . . . , n−1}. Now take
any q ∈ (0, 1], and let A = {Cq, Cq′} for some q′ ∈ (0, 1].
Case 1. Let q′ ∈ (0, 1] be such that q < q′ and CWq′(R) ⊆ CWq(R)
at any R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n. Now, take any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n. If CWq(R) = ∅,
then CWq′(R) = ∅. Thus, Cq(R) = Cq′(R) = {1}. Hence, Cq is self-selective
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at R relative to A. If CWq(R) 6= ∅, then Cq ∈ CWq(L) for any L ∈ L(A, R).
Therefore, Cq is self-selective at R relative to A.
Case 2. Let q′ ∈ (0, 1] be such that q′ < q and CWq(R) $ CWq′(R)
at any R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n. Then we have dnq′e < dnqe as CWq(R) $ CWq′(R)
at any R ∈ ∪m∈NL(Im)n. Set r = ndnq′e , and consider brc. Now let m =
brc + 2, and construct a preference profile R˜ ∈ L (Im)n as follows: For i ∈
{(brc − t)dnq′e + 1, . . . , (brc − t + 1)dnq′e}, let L(m − t, R˜i) = Im where
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , brc}, (m−s)R˜i(m−s−1) for any s ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m−2} and 1R˜im.
For i ∈ {brcdnq′e + 1, . . . , n}, let L(m,Ri) = Im, and (m − s)R˜i(m − s − 1)
for any s ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 2}. Pictorially, R˜ is defined as follows:
R˜1 · · · R˜dnq′e
2
1
m
m− 1
...
3
R˜dnq
′e+1 · · · R˜2dnq′e
3
2
1
m
...
4
· · ·
· · ·
R˜(brc−1)dnq
′e+1 · · · R˜brcdnq′e
m− 1
m− 2
...
2
1
m
R˜brcdnq
′e+1 · · ·Rn
m
m− 1
...
3
2
1
Now for any a ∈ Im \{1}, we have | {i ∈ N | aR˜i(a+ 1)} |= dnq′e < dnqe.
Therefore, a /∈ CWq(R˜), in particular Cq(R˜) 6= a. Moreover for each i ∈ N
2R˜i1, thus 1 /∈ CWq(R˜). Hence CWq(R˜) = ∅, so Cq(R˜) = 1. On the
other hand, 2 ∈ CWq′(R˜) and 1 /∈ CWq′(R˜) implying that Cq′(R˜) = 2.
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So, we have Cq′L
iCq for each i ∈ N , where L(A, R˜) = L, which implies that
Cq(L) = Cq′ 6= Cq. Hence, Cq is not self-selective at R˜ relative to A, thus it
is not self-selective relative to A.
Definition 11. An SCF F is said to be of degree (1-q) if it is self-selective
relative to A = {F,Cq′} for any q′ ∈ (q, 1], and it is not self-selective relative
to A = {F,Cq′} for some q′ ∈ (0, q].
Remark 3. By previous proposition, given | N |= n, Cq has degree n−ln where
q ∈ ( l
n
, l+1
n
] for some integer l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
An immediate corollary to the above proposition shows the maximal sub-
set, Ar, of the set of rival SCFs such that Cq is self-selective relative to
A = {Cq} ∪ Ar.
Corrolary 1. Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals and q ∈ (0, 1]
be such that q ∈ ( l
n
, l+1
n
] for some integer l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Now, Ar =
{Cq′ | q′ ∈ ( ln , 1]} is the maximal subfamily of {Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]} such that Cq
is self-selective relative to A = {Cq} ∪ Ar.
Proof. First note that by previous proposition, Cq′ /∈ Ar for any q ∈ (0, ln ].
Let m ∈ N, R ∈ L(Im)n be given. If CWq(R) = ∅ then for any q′ ∈ ( ln , 1],
CWq′(R) = ∅. So, Cq(R) = Cq′(R) = 1 for any Cq′ ∈ Ar, implying that
Cq is self-selective at R relative to A = {Cq} ∪ Ar. If CWq(R) 6= ∅, then
Cq(R) ∈ CWq(L) for any L ∈ L(A, R). Therefore, Cq is self-selective at R
relative to A. Hence, Cq is self-selective relative to Ar.
Remark 4. If the self-selectivity degree of an SCF F increases, then F be-
comes more self-selective.
The above corollary provides a useful property of the family of generalized
Condorcet functions. By the previous proposition, a Condorcet function,
Cq, is not self-selective when it is tested against a more generous Condorcet
function Cq′ . So, the corollary implies that, Cq fails to choose itself among
13
any set of rival SCFs including Cq′ . Furthermore, if a Condorcet function
chooses itself in pairwise tests with other Condorcet functions, then it also
chooses itself after the aggregation of the test SCFs.
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CHAPTER 4
SELF-SELECTIVITY DEGREES OF SOME
FAMILIES OF SOCIAL CHOICE
FUNCTIONS
4.1 p-Qualified Majority Functions
Now, given m ∈ N, λ ∈ L (Im), write τ(λ) = a if and only if L(a, λ) = Im
for some a ∈ Im. For any m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n let T (R) = {τ(Ri) : i ∈ N}.
Definition 12. Let R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n be given. An alternative a ∈ T (R)
is said to be a p-qualified majority winner for some p ∈ [0, 1] if | {i ∈ N :
L(a,Ri) = Im} |≥ np.
We denote set of all p-qualified majority winners by MWp(R) at each
R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n. An SCR Mp is said to be a p-qualified majority rule if it
selects all p-qualified majority winners at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Definition 13. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, the p-qualified majority function,
Mp, is defined by:
Mp(R) =
 1 if MWp(R) = ∅min{MWp(R)} if MWp(R) 6= ∅
Now, let MWp(L) be the set of all p-qualified majority winners where
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L ∈ L(A, R) for R ∈ L (Im)n. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, the self-selectivity
of the p-qualified majority function relative to A is defined as follows1 :
- When MWp(L) = ∅ for some L ∈ L(A, R), then Mp is trivially
self-selective at R relative to A.
- When MWp(L) 6= ∅ for each L ∈ L(A, R), Mp is self-selective at R
relative to A if Mp ∈MWp(L) for some L ∈ L(A, R).
Proposition 2. Let N be a finite nonempty society with n ≥ 3.
1. Mp is self-selective relative to A = {Mp, Cq} for every q ∈ (n−1n , 1] when
p ∈ ( 1
n
, 1].
2. Mp is self-selective relative to A = {Mp, Cq} for every q ∈ (0, 1] when
p ∈ [0, 1
n
].
Proof. (1) Take any m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, q ∈ (n−1n , 1] and let A = {Mp, Cq},
where p ∈ ( 1
n
, 1]. First, consider the case where CWq(R) 6= ∅. Then we have
MWp(R) 6= ∅, and in particular Cq(R) = Mp(R). Thus, Mp is self-selective
at R relative to A. Now, consider the case where CWq(R) = ∅. Then we
have either MWp(R) = ∅ or MWp(R) 6= ∅. If the former holds, we have
Cq(R) = Mp(R) = 1. If the latter holds, Mp ∈MWp(L), where L ∈ L(A, R).
Therefore, Mp is self-selective at R relative to A.
Now, let A = {Mp, Cq} for some q ∈ (0, n−1n ], where p ∈ ( 1n , 1]. Set
m = n+ 2, and define R˜ ∈ L (Im)n as follows: An alternative a ∈ Im is most
preferred by individual i ∈ N if a− i = 2, | {i ∈ N | L(2, R˜i = m− 1} |= n,
and 1 ∈ Im is bottom ranked by all individuals. That is we have:
1Note that here and in the definitions of self-selectivity for other classes of SCRs in the
sequel, the note closing chapter 2 applies.
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R˜1 R˜2 . . . R˜n
3 4 . . . n+ 2
2 2 . . . 2
...
...
...
...
1 1 . . . 1
So, MWp(R) = ∅ implying thatMp(R˜) = 1. On the other hand, CWq(R˜) 6=
∅ and 1 /∈ CWq(R˜). Hence, L(A, R˜) consists of only one element L where Cq
is top ranked by all individuals. Thus, Mp(L) = Cq 6= Mp. Therefore, Mp is
not self-selective relative to A.
(2) Take any m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, q ∈ (0, 1] and let A = {Mp, Cq} where
p ∈ [0, 1
n
]. Clearly, MWp(R) = T (R). Now, take any L ∈ L(A, R), then
we have Mp ∈ MWp(L). Hence Mp is self-selective relative to A whenever
p ∈ [0, 1
n
].
Corrolary 2. Let N be a finite nonempty society with n ≥ 3.
1. For p ∈ ( 1
n
, 1], Mp has degree
1
n
.
2. For p ∈ [0, 1
n
], Mp has degree 1.
Proof. Follows from the definition of self-selectivity degree.
Corrolary 3. Let N be a finite nonempty society with n ≥ 3.
1. For p ∈ ( 1
n
, 1], Ar = {Cq | q ∈ (n−1n , 1]} is the maximal subfamily of
{Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]} such that Mp is self-selective relative to A = {Mp}∪Ar.
2. For p ∈ [0, 1
n
], Ar = {Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]} is the maximal family such that
Mp is self-selective relative to A = {Mp} ∪ Ar.
Proof. (1) Note that by above proposition, Cq /∈ Ar for any q ∈ (0, n−1n ]. Let
m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n be given. We now that Cq = Cq′ for any q, q′ ∈ (n−1n , 1].
So we have either CWq(R) = ∅ or CWq(R) 6= ∅. Thus, as we discussed in the
above proposition, both cases imply that Mp is self-selective relative to A.
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(2) Obvious.
4.2 Convex and Concave Scoring Functions
Given any m ∈ N, consider a vector s = (m,m − 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rm. For any
i ∈ N, a ∈ Im denote ai with [ai = sk if and only if | {b ∈ Im | bRia} |= k−1].
Definition 14. Given any m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, an alternative a ∈ Im is said
to be a scoring winner at R if
∑
i∈N ai ≥
∑
i∈N bi for any b ∈ Im.
We denote the set of all scoring winners by SW (R) at eachR ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Now, an SCR S is called as a scoring rule if it selects all scoring winners at
each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Definition 15. Let m ∈ N be given.
i. An SCR S ∈ N is called a concave scoring rule if si ≥ si+1 for any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1} and s1 − s2 ≤ s2 − s3 ≤ . . . ≤ sm−1 − sm.
ii. An SCR S ∈ N is called a convex scoring rule if si ≥ si+1 for any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m− 1} and s1 − s2 ≥ s2 − s3 ≥ . . . ≥ sm−1 − sm.
Definition 16. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, an SCF S ∈ F is called a
scoring function if S(R) = min{SW (R)}.
A scoring function is said to be self-selective relative to a set, A, containing
itself if, for any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, there exists L ∈ L(A, R) such that S ∈
SW (L).
Proposition 3. 1. Given n ≥ 3, a concave scoring function S is not self-
selective relative to A = {S,Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1].
2. Given n ≥ 5, a convex scoring function S is not self-selective relative
to A = {S,Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1].
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Proof. First consider the case where s1 − s2 = s2 − s3 = . . . = sm−1 − sm
for any m ∈ N. Now let m = n + 1, and define R˜ ∈ L (Im)n as follows:
For the first n − 1 individual, let L(1, R˜i) = Im and, tR˜i(t + 1) for every
t ∈ {1, 2, ..,m− 1}. For the last individual, let L(2, R˜i) = Im, L(1, R˜i) = {1},
and tR˜i(t+ 1) for every t ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m− 1}. Pictorially, R˜ is defined as:
R˜1 R˜2 · · · R˜n−1 R˜n
1 1 · · · 1 2
2 2 · · · 2 3
3 3 · · · 3 4
...
...
...
...
...
m− 1 m− 1 · · · m− 1 m
m m · · · m 1
For any q ∈ (0, 1], we have either CWq(R˜) = ∅ or 1 ∈ CWq(R˜). Thus,
Cq(R˜) = 1. On the other hand,
∑
i∈N 2i >
∑
i∈N ai for any a ∈ Im \ {2}.
Therefore, S(R˜) = 2. Thus, S(L) = Cq 6= S as |{i ∈ N |CqLiS}| = n − 1,
where L(A, R˜) = L. Hence, S is not self-selective relative to A = {S,Cq} for
any q ∈ (0, 1].
Now, consider the cases where we have at least one strict inequality be-
tween sj − sj+1 and sj+1 − sj+2 for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2}.
Let S be a concave scoring function. Set m = n and let R˜ be defined as
above. Then, for any q ∈ (0, 1], either CWq(R˜) = ∅, or 1 ∈ CWq(R˜). Thus,
Cq(R˜) = 1. Moreover, we have
∑
i∈N 2i >
∑
i∈N ai for any a ∈ Im \ {2}.
Hence, S(R˜) = 2. As |{i ∈ N |CqLiS}| = n− 1, where L(A, R˜) = L, S(L) =
Cq 6= S. Thus, a concave scoring function S is not self-selective relative to
A = {S,Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1].
Now, consider a convex scoring function S. Take any m ∈ N. Define R′ ∈
L (Im)n as follows: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 }, L(2, R
′i) = Im and L(1, R
′i) = {1}.
For i ∈ {n+1
2
, . . . , n}, L(1, R′i) = Im and L(2, R′i) = Im \ {1}.
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R
′1 . . . R
′ n−1
2 R
′ n+1
2 . . . R
′n
2 . . . 2 1 . . . 1
...
...
... 2 . . . 2
...
...
...
...
...
...
1 . . . 1
...
...
...
So, for any q ∈ (0, 1] we have Cq(R′) = 1. If
∑
i∈N 2i >
∑
i∈N 1i holds
then S is not self-selective relative to A. This situation occurs if and only if
the following inequality holds:
(
n− 1
2
)(s2 − sm) > (s1 − s2)
Now, define R′′ ∈ L (Im)n as follows: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 }, L(2, R
′i) = Im
and L(1, R
′i) = Im \ {2}. For i ∈ {n+12 , . . . , n}, L(a,R
′′i) = Im if a− i = 5−n2
for some a ∈ Im, 1 is the second choice and 2 is the third choice of each
i ∈ {n+1
2
, . . . , n}.
R
′′1 . . . R
′′ n−1
2 R
′′ n+1
2 . . . R
′′n
2 . . . 2 3 . . . 3 + (n−1
2
)
1 . . . 1 1 . . . 1
...
...
... 2 . . . 2
...
...
...
...
...
...
Then, we have Cq(R
′′) = 1 for each q ∈ (0, 1]. Again, if∑i∈N 2i >∑i∈N 1i
holds then S is not self-selective relative to A. But this situation requires the
following inequality:
s1 − s2 > (n+ 1
n− 1)(s2 − s3)
Combining the above two inequalities imply that for n ≥ 5, a convex scoring
function S is not self-selective relative to A = {S,Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1].
We say that a SCF F has degree −∞ if it is not self-selective relative to
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A = {F,Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1]. So, we have an immediate corollary to the
above proposition:
Corrolary 4. Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals.
1. For any n ≥ 3, a concave scoring function S has degree −∞.
2. For any n ≥ 5, a convex scoring function S has degree −∞.
Proof. By definition.
4.3 k-Plurality Functions and Majoritarian Com-
promise
Now, consider a different type of scoring rule, namely the k-plurality rule.
In this method, each individual gives exactly one point to each of the k-
alternatives which she likes best, and then k-plurality rule chooses the alter-
native which gets the most points. Given m ∈ N, the scoring vector of a
k-plurality rule, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 12, assigns 1 to the first k-components and 0
to the rest, i.e. s = (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0). We denote the set of all k-plurality
winners by PWk(R) at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, and define an SCR Pk as a
k-plurality rule if it selects all k-plurality winners at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n.
Definition 17. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, an SCF Pk ∈ N is said to be a
k-plurality function if Pk(R) = min{PWk(R)}.
A k-plurality function is said to be self-selective relative to a set, A, con-
taining itself if, for any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, there exists L ∈ L(A, R) such that
Pk ∈ PWk(L).
A k-plurality function is a convex scoring function for k = 1. Therefore,
from previous proposition, it is known that a 1-plurality function, P1, is not
2Given m ∈ N, k-plurality rule, when k = m, is trivially self-selective relative to any set
of test functions Ar = {Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]} with | Ar |≥ k − 1.
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self-selective relative to A = {P1, Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1] whenever n ≥ 5. The
following remark gives a preference profile over a set of alternatives when
there are exactly 3 individuals such that P1 is not self-selective relative to
A = {P1, Cq} for any q ∈ (0, 1].
Remark 5. Let n = 3, and consider P1. Set m = 4 and define R ∈ L (Im)n as
follows:
R1 R2 R3
2 3 4
1 1 1
3 2 2
4 4 3
Clearly, for any q ∈ (0, 1], Cq(R) = 1. On the other hand we have
P1(R) = 2. So, Cq is top ranked by individuals 2 and 3, and P1 is top ranked
by individual 1 over the linear order profile L, where L(A, R) = {L}. So,
P1(L) = Cq implying that 1-plurality function is not self-selective relative to
A for any n ≥ 3.
Thus, a 1-plurality function has degree −∞ for n ≥ 3. However, if we
test Pk, for k > 1, against only one SCF, then Pk is not well-defined over
the preference profile on the set of SCFs since we only have two functions as
alternatives over the induced preference profile on the set of SCFs. Therefore,
for k > 1, the self-selectivity degree of a k-plurality function is not well-
defined. The following remark shows that whenever we test a k-plurality
function, k > 1, against any set of q-Condorcet functions, so that Pk is well-
defined over the induced preference profile on the set of SCFs, Pk is never self-
selective relative to the set of rival SCFs. Thus we need to test a k-plurality
function against any set of q-Condorcet functions with | {Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]} |≥ k.
Remark 6. Take any finite nonempty set of individuals N with n ≥ 3. Con-
sider any k-plurality function, Pk, for k ≥ 3. Take any Ar = {Cq | q ∈ (0, 1]}
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with | Ar |≥ k, and let A = {Pk} ∪ Ar. Set m = 4 + (k − 3)n, and de-
fine R ∈ L (Im)n as follows: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 }, 2Ri3Ri4Ri(4 + i). For
i ∈ {n+1
2
, . . . , n− 1}, 1Ri2Ri4Ri(4 + i). For i = n, 3Ri1Ri2Ri(4 + i). Finally,
for each i ∈ N , [(4 + i) + tn]Ri[(4 + i) + (t + 1)n]. That is, we have the
following preference profile:
R1 . . . R
n−1
2 R
n+1
2 . . . Rn−1 Rn
2 . . . 2 1 . . . 1 3
3 . . . 3 2 . . . 2 1
4 . . . 4 4 . . . 4 2
5 . . . n+7
2
n+9
2
. . . n+ 3 n+ 4
n+ 5 . . . 3n+7
2
3n+9
2
. . . 2n+ 3 2n+ 4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
So, for any q ∈ (0, 1], we have Cq(R) = 1. On the other hand, for any
k ≥ 3, Pk = 2. It is given that | Ar |≥ k. Thus, for any L ∈ L(A, R),
Pk(L) ∈ A \ {Pk} since | {i ∈ N | 1Ri2} |= n+12 . Hence, Pk is not self-
selective relative to A for k ≥ 3.
Let n = 3, and consider P2. Take any Ar as defined above with | Ar |≥ 2,
and let A = {P2} ∪ Ar. Set m = 3 and define R ∈ L (Im) as follows:
3R12R11, 1R22R23, and 1R32R33. Clearly Cq(R) = 1 for each q ∈ (0, 1],
however P2(R) = 2. So, for any L ∈ L(A, R), P2(L) ∈ A \ {P2}. Therefore,
P2 is not self-selective relative to A for n = 3. Now, let n ≥ 5, m = 3
and define R ∈ L (Im) as follows: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 }, 2Ri3Ri1. For i ∈
{n+1
2
, . . . , n− 1}, 1Ri2Ri3. Finally, for i = n, 3Ri1Ri2.
R1 . . . R
n−1
2
2
3
1
R
n+1
2 . . . Rn−1
1
2
3
Rn
3
1
2
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Thus, we have P2(R) = 2 and, for each q ∈ (0, 1], Cq(R) = 1 implying that
P2(L) ∈ A \ {P2}. Hence, a 2-plurality function is not self-selective relative
to A.
As we have seen, in k-plurality rule, an alternative does not need to have
the majority of the votes to get chosen. Moreover, number k is exogenous for
each preference profile over the set of alternatives. The next SCR, majori-
tarian compromise3, basically differs from k-plurality rule within these two
situations. Firstly, in majoritarian compromise rule, an alternative needs to
have at least a majority of the votes to get chosen, which is more restrictive
than a plurality rule. Secondly, the number k is endogenously determined
for each preference profile over the set of alternatives, which is less restric-
tive than a plurality rule. We provide self-selectivity degree of majoritarian
compromise rule and conclude that it inherits almost the same self-selectivity
properties with any k-plurality rule.
We define a majoritarian compromise rule as follows 4: We start by exam-
ining the first row of the preference profile. If an alternative gets a majority
of votes, then this alternative is referred as a majoritarian compromise win-
ner. If there is no majoritarian compromise winner at the first row, we start
considering alternatives at the first two rows of the preference profile. If a
majority of the individuals prefers an alternative as either their first best
or second best, then that alternative is chosen by the majoritarian compro-
mise rule. If there is no majoritarian compromise winner in the first two
rows, then we move on to the third row and apply the same procedure. We
stop when an alternative receives a majority support. We denote the set of
all majoritarian compromise winners by MCW (R) at each preference profile
R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, and define an SCR MC as a majoritarian compromise rule
if it selects all majoritarian compromise winners at each R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im).
For each a ∈MCW (R) at a given preference profile R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, we
3Introduced by Murat Sertel.
4Sanver [2009]
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denote the set of individuals supporting that alternative by Supp(a). Then,
we define the set of majoritarian compromise winners with highest support,
MCW ∗(R), by
MCW ∗(R) = {a ∈MCW (R) | ∀b ∈MCW (R): | Supp(a) |≥| Supp(b) |}
Definition 18. Given m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n, an SCF MC is called a majori-
tarian compromise function if MC(R) = min{MCW ∗(R)}.
The majoritarian compromise function is said to be self-selective relative
to a set, A, containing itself if for any R ∈ ∪m∈N L (Im)n, there exists L ∈
L(A, R) such that MC ∈MCW ∗(L).
Proposition 4. Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals with n = 3.
MC is self-selective relative to A = {MC,Cq} for every q ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n such
that MC is not self-selective at R relative to A = {MC,Cq} for some q ∈
(0, 1]. We have either CWq(R) = ∅ or CWq(R) 6= ∅. First consider the
case where CWq(R) = ∅, so Cq(R) = 1. Since MC is not self-selective at
R relative to A, we must have MC(R) ∈ Im \ {1}, and also | {i ∈ N |
1RiMC(R)} |≥ 2. However, this contradicts with MC(R) ∈ Im \ {1}. Now,
consider the case where CWq(R) 6= ∅, and let Cq(R) = a. Then we must have
MC(R) ∈ Im\{a}, and | {i ∈ N | aRiMC(R)} |≥ 2 again contradicting with
MC(R) ∈ Im \ {a}. Hence, MC is self-selective relative to A = {MC,Cq}
for every q ∈ (0, 1] whenever n = 3.
The above proposition implies that for n = 3, the majoritarian compro-
mise function has degree 1. The following corollary shows the maximal set
of rival SCF such that majoritarian compromise funtcion is relatively self-
selective when n = 3.
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Corrolary 5. Let N be a finite set of individuals with n = 3. Ar = {Cq |
q ∈ (0, 1]} is the maximal set such that MC is self-selective relative to A =
{MC} ∪ Ar.
Proof. Suppose that there exist m ∈ N, R ∈ L (Im)n such that for every
L ∈ L(A, R) we have MC /∈ MCW (L). Thus for some q ∈ (0, 1] we must
have MC(R) 6= Cq(R) and also | {i ∈ N | CqRiMC(R)} |≥ 2,contradicting
with MC(R) ∈MCW (R).
Proposition 5. Let N be a finite nonempty set of individuals with n ≥ 5.
MC is not self-selective relative to A = {MC,Cq} for every q ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. Let m = 4 and define R ∈ L (Im) as follows: For i ∈ {1, . . . , n−12 },
2Ri3Ri1Ri4. For i ∈ {n+1
2
, . . . , n − 1}, 1Ri2Ri3Ri4. For i = n, 3Ri1Ri2Ri4.
So we have:
R1 . . . R
n−1
2
2
3
1
4
R
n+1
2 . . . Rn−1
1
2
3
4
Rn
3
1
2
4
Thus, Cq(R) = 1 for every q ∈ (0, 1] and MC(R) = 2. Hence, MC(L) =
Cq where L is the only preference profile over A induced by R.
Thus, by definition, for every n ≥ 5, the majoritarian compromise function
has degree −∞.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we localize the notion of self-selectivity. For this purpose,
we restrict the set of rival SCFs to particular singleton-valued refinements
of generalized Condorcet rules. First, we characterize the self-selectivity of
generalized Condorcet functions and, then, show that this family of SCFs has
some useful properties. Well-behaved pattern with respect to self-selectivity
exhibited by this family allows us to define the concept of self-selectivity
degree of SCFs. Combining the self-selectivity degree of SCFs and the ag-
gregation property of test SCFs enable us to find the maximal set of SCFs
relative to which an SCF is self-selective. Hence, we show that self-selectivity
degree can be used to compare strength of self-selectivity of SCFs.
We test self-selectivity of some family of SCFs and obtain non-dictatorial
self-selective SCFs. However, for a given society, these non-dictatorial self-
selective SCFs are equal to either a 1-Condorcet function or a 1
n
-Condorcet
function. Hence, except the generalized Condorcet functions, there is not a
continuous change in the self-selectivity degree of non-dictatorial SCFs that
we test. That is, we observe sharp changes in self-selectivity degrees within
some families of SCFs. However, we still do not know due to which properties
of these SCFs there exist such a change in self-selectivity degree. Thus, a full
characterization of self-selective SCFs with this restricted set of test SCFs
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may shed some light on this problem. On the other hand, in our study, we
only consider SCFs. However, allowing social choice rules to be set-valued
and defining the self-selectivity degree accordingly are yet to be dealt with.
Finally, SCCs enable us to use algebraic operations. Thus, the change in
self-selectivity degree under algebraic operations is an open problem.
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